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INTRODUCTION 
According to Rule 50, Utah Rules of Appellant 
Procedure, the Reply Brief shall address only "arguments first 
raised in the brief in opposition." Therefore, although the 
Appellant strongly disagrees with the argument and much of the 
statement of law set forth by the Respondent, these issues are 
not addressed in the Reply Brief. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED IN REPLY 
The issues addressed in this Reply Brief are: 
1. Was there a pre-trial order, as alleged by 
defendants, which permitted notice of Dr. Clark as an expert 
witness just 10 days before trial? 
2. What was the true state of the record regarding 
notice of expert witnesses before trial? 
3. Did Appellant misstate any law in the main brief? 
ii 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO PRE-TRIAL ORDER WHICH ALLOWED DEFENDANTS 
TO GIVE LATE NOTICE OF DR. LINCOLN CLARK AS AN EXPERT 
WITNESS. THE DEALINGS OF THE PARTIES AND ORDERS OF 
THE COURT MAKE IT CLEAR THAT RESPONDENTS WERE ALLOWED 
LEAVE TO OBTAIN ONE REPLACEMENT EXPERT WITNESS FOR DR. 
BECK, NOT TO ADD AN ADDITIONAL EXPERT WITNESS. 
Respondents stated in their Brief: "... the plaintiff 
received that notice [of Dr. Clark] ten days before trial as 
required by the pre-trial order.11 Respondents1 Brief, p. 19 
(emphasis added); see also Respondents1 Brief, p. 5. Respondents 
thus imply that the trial court signed and adopted a pre-trial 
orde^ -, and that they were in compliance with that pre-trial order 
in aiving notice of Dr. Clark as an expert witness 10 days before 
the February 2, 1987, trial. Respondents1 statements in this 
regaird are extremely misleading for the following reasons: 
1. There was never as a signed pre-trial order. R. 
248. 
2. The proposed pre-trial order, executed by counsel 
11 iiays before the scheduled November 17, 1986 trial date, 
contemplated that all expert witnesses had already been listed. 
3. The trial court explicitly gave Respondents leave 
to [replace only one witness, not to open the case up for 
additional witnesses. 
Perusal of the proposed pre-trial order clearly shows 
wher it was received by the court, and that it was never signed. 
1 
R. 248. However, even if we assume that the unexecuted, proposed 
pre-trial order somehow applies de facto, it is clear that all 
proposed expert witnesses were listed. R. 243-6. That was 
certainly the understood intent of counsel and the court at the 
time it was drafted by Appellant's counsel. The context of the 
proposed order is extremely important; it was signed by 
respective counsel just 11 days before the then-scheduled trial. 
Respondents had already submitted a "defendants' witness and 
exhibit list", which had been incorporated into the proposed 
order. No additional expert witnesses were contemplated since it 
stated "in the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel 
to the contrary" in the preamble. R. 2 35. Respondents1 expert 
witness list had already stated that they were only calling Dr. 
Edward C. Beck to testify on the brain injury issue. See 
proposed pre-trial order, R. 244. 
Respondents' Brief conveys the impression that 
Respondents had leave to add expert witnesses up to 10 days of 
trial and therefore, plaintiff has no gripe. The falsity of 
these claims is best shown by the context of events leading to 
the fifth (and final) trial date (February 2, 1987): 
a. In July, 1986, Appellant made a motion to amend 
the complaint to add a cause of action for brain injury. R. 
135. 
b. On August 28, 1986, Respondents replied with a 
motion for mental examination of the plaintiff, to be performed 
by Edward C. Beck, Ph.D., a neuropsychologist. R. 154. 
2 
c. No other request was made by defendants to have an 
expert examine the plaintiff on the issue of brain injury, prior 
to the scheduled trial date of November 17, 1986. 
d. In this context the proposed pre-trial order was 
drafted and submitted to opposing counsel on November 6, 1986, or 
approximately 11 days prior to trial. Dr. Beck was listed as 
the Respondents1 only brain injury expert in this draft of the 
pre-ttrial order. R. 244. 
e. A few days later, on November 8, 1986, Respondents 
made a motion for a continuance of the trial (R. 252-7) on the 
grounds that Dr. Beck was ill, and could not testify. The 
stated reason was to allow Respondents: 
... to obtain the services of another expert 
witness and permit that witness to review the 
voluminous medical records, test results and 
evaluations involved in the claim and 
personally evaluate plaintiff prior to the 
scheduled trial on November 17, 1986. 
(emphasis added) 
R. 2fU. 
f. Appellant strongly objected to the continuance; but 
when it appeared that the judge was going to grant it, counsel 
stated clearly the understanding that the continuance not simply 
be ait excuse to do more discovery, but only to obtain one expert 
witness to replace Dr. Beck who was allegedly ill. The following 
colloquy occurred at the November 10, 1986, hearing on the 
continuance: November 10, 1986: 
MR. SYKES: ... I think Bill and I have an 
understanding, but I just want to make it a 
matter of record that this is not reopening 
discovery in general. This is just for the 
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purpose of getting one witness to replace. Dr. 
Beck. Is that your understanding also? 
THE COURT: Yes, it is my understanding. 
MR. SYKES: Okay. (emphasis added) 
(T. R-23-24). 
g. A few days later, Respondents submitted the name of 
Dr. Lincoln Clark, a psychiatrist, who subsequently examined Mr. 
Onyeabor. Dr. Clark's withdrawal from the case is well 
documented in the briefs. He stated he was irrevocably 
withdrawing from the case. The court held a hearing on December 
5, 1986, to deal with the issue of Dr. Clark's withdrawal. 
h. Mr. Stegall stated at the hearing that he had a Dr. 
Cook from Denver lined up to replace Dr. Clark. (T. S-27) The 
trial was continued with the clear understanding that Judge Dee 
would get it back on the calendar as quickly as he could. (T. 
S-2 6:13) Once again, it was clear that the continuance was to 
enable Mr. Stegall to obtain a replacement witness for Dr. Clark, 
not to simply reopen discovery, which had long since been closed. 
(R. S-30:19) This understanding with respect to the discovery 
cut-off was clearly shown by the following colloquy at the 
hearing on November 10, 1986: 
MR. STEGALL: Your Honor, we had a 2:00 cut-
off for filing witnesses and exhibits. Are 
we moving that back? 
MR. SYKES: I think we ought to move it back. 
THE COURT: Move it back so you can have an 
opportunity to tell him who, and they will 
have an opportunity to counter. 
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MR. SYKES: Can we move it back one week. Is 
that okay Bill? 
THE COURT: Is that alright with you [Mr. 
Stegall]? 
MR. STEGALL: I will indicate it is my 
understanding we are not reopening discovery, 
but certainly if Mr. Sykes needs to get not 
only that witness but potentially others, I 
would work with him, but we're not ... 
THE COURT: Right ... (emphasis added) 
T. Rf25. Thus, all parties and the court viewed the case as 
having been ready for trial both in November and in December of 
1986,| the only reason for the continuances was to allow 
Respondents to get a replacement expert witness on the brain 
injury issue. There was never any contemplation in the eyes of 
the ^ourt or counsel that these extensions of time were simply to 
plow more furrows of discovery with additional witnesses. 
Rule 26(e)(1)(B) requires that a party must "seasonably 
... Supplement" discovery with respect to the identity of expert 
witnesses expected to be called. Discovery had been closed. 
Appellant's earlier discovery had requested the identity of 
experts and the name of Lincoln Clark as a "resurrected witness" 
was simply not provided until it was too late for Appellant to 
fairly prepare to counter his testimony. 
POINT II 
THE LAW WAS NOT MISSTATED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Respondents' Brief points out that Appellant cited the 
case of DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 433 F.Supp. 1047 
(E.D, Pa. 1977), which has been reversed. See 580 F.2d 1193 
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(1978). The reversal of the district court case was simply 
overlooked. However, no implication should be drawn that the 
law of the original DeMarines case is any way repudiated by 
courts in general. DeMarines was reversed on its facts. T\the 
law cited in Point II of Appellant's main brief is the majority 
rule and should apply to this case. 
DATED this 16th day of July, 1990. 
KOBERT B. SYKES " '/' ' 
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